2026/05/27
After 4 years of war the Armed Forces of Ukraine finally achieved to halt the constant, but ever-slowing Russian offensive. If we can even call the endless meat wave attacks that Russia is conducting in the past few years an “offensive”.
Escalation, or de-escalation?
The previously surfacing rumours about a new Russian mobilisation are becoming more credible every month. If Ukraine continues to inflict higher casualties than what Russia can recruit month after month, Putin will be forced to choose between two options. He either has to call for another wave of mobilisation, or offer a ceasefire on terms that are more favourable to Ukraine.
It seems like many in the Russian elite are now trying to persuade him to opt for the latter. They are quietly building the ground for that possibility. At this point, some media are framing narratives that the “Special Military Operation” has already achieved its goal, and any further military action would only lead to a Pyrrhic victory.
At the end of the day, this will be only Putin’s decision. Forces inside Russia may try to push him in one direction or another, but so far, they have proven unsuccessful every time when it came to the war. He is much too obsessed with the total control of Ukraine, and as of now he still believes he can win, and that it’s only a matter of time until the frontline starts collapsing.
However, so far, he also did everything in his power to avoid another mobilisation. Right now is probably not the optimal time for him to reconsider it, with the Russian parliamentary elections approaching in September. Until then, the most likely outcome is that he’ll continue the covert mobilisation with the usual tricks. These include things like forcing people to sign up for the war in exchange for getting rid of mock charges or pressuring students and debtors, and the offer of more and more money.Â
Speaking of money, he got some extra coming his way with Israeli-US war on Iran and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, increasing energy prices, and the US sanctions relief. That, however, seems to be getting close to an end along with higher oil prices, and financing might become an increasingly bigger concern.
Whether a new mobilisation wave could even solve Russia’s problems is getting increasingly doubtful. Many western studies (Abre numa nova janela) and think tanks (Abre numa nova janela) arrive at a similar conclusion with Russian milbloggers agreeing with their assessment. Decorated veteran (Abre numa nova janela), blogger, ex-FSB agent and international terrorist (Abre numa nova janela) Igor Girkin who is fittingly serving a jail sentence for speaking the truth about the reality on the battlefield, has been calling for a large-scale mobilisation since year one of the invasion.
With hindsight of the current situation in 2026, it seems like he was correct, and Russia would likely be in a much better position right now. But as of lately his (Abre numa nova janela) - and other Russian milbloggers’s (Abre numa nova janela) - expectation of a potential Russian victory is getting ever more gloomy. He claims that at this point not even a mobilisation would lead to victory, or even to a successful offensive, just an even bigger bloodbath.
Putin probably still thinks that he should continue the war as long as it takes because eventually, there will be a world event that turns the tide for him. He wants there to still exist an active hostility on the ground so he can grab that opportunity to finish Ukraine off. It will be a difficult task to convince him otherwise.
As of now, several similar events have occurred, and he has failed to meaningfully capitalise on any of them. Trump’s reelection - his Miracle of the House of Brandenburg moment (Abre numa nova janela) - couldn’t achieve a breakthrough for him. Not with him cutting off support for Ukraine, and not even with his attack on Iran. Despite all of these, the Russian military achieved absolutely nothing on the battlefields since they managed to push out the Ukrainians from Kursk Oblast in the early weeks of Trump’s presidency with the help of North Korean troops. One can’t help but wonder where Ukraine could be right now if there was a US president who wasn’t Putin’s number 1 fan.
The underlying change in the balance of power.
Even if Putin decided to stop the active phase of the war and press for a ceasefire, he couldn't unilaterally proclaim it because the Ukrainians will have to agree as well. As long as it's Armed Forces carry on inflicting higher casualties (Abre numa nova janela) than what Russia can recruit and even manage to liberate their territories, they have much less incentive to accept a ceasefire. At least not on terms that the Kremlin would likely be willing to offer.
If Putin wants to push through a ceasefire deal, he would likely need to escalate first. This could be a new wave of mobilisation or renewal of public nuclear threats. Many Western analysts are raising alarm bells over the possibility that he might be planning some kinetic actions against the Baltic states to test and destroy NATO’s Article 5. With the hope that it would put him in a better negotiating position. As of today, I am not convinced that he will go through with it (Abre numa nova janela). There might be battle plans forming in the Russian military for this scenario, which is expected, but there is no evidence that Putin has decided on anything.
Still, there are similar signs that, alongside a possible declaration of victory, a narrative around a potential escalation in the Baltics is emerging. Europe’s responsibility now is to deter this option by convincing Putin that it would be devastating for Russia and his rule, there would be a definitive response, and Europe would not give in.
Countries, governments, and leaders on the continent have been on ever higher alert since the 2022 invasion, and then since Trump’s return in 2025. From that time, they proved capable of stepping up to the occasion when it came to uniting to impose unprecedented sanctions on Russia, starting to arm and finance Ukraine, and getting off Russian oil. Since Trump 2.0 Europe successfully managed to take over support for Ukraine and deterred a possible US invasion (Abre numa nova janela) of Greenland (Abre numa nova janela) just a few months ago. At the same time, the continent is rearming and preparing to face a Russian threat head-on, even without the United States.Â
Many - especially military and geopolitical analysts - love to bash on the EU and European countries, but these developments are not insignificant. The continent has been slowly but surely undergoing a full geopolitical transformation in the past nearly five years. In many ways Europe is preparing for this attack since 2022. It would be a huge mistake for Putin to assume that he could get away with it.
But let’s assume that he makes up his mind to sue for peace, and Ukraine refuses. There are many voices in the country that would prefer to go on until every occupied territory is liberated.
If Putin makes that call, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are making gains on the battlefield, these voices will be difficult to quieten. They either need something from Russia or the EU in exchange, or a conviction that they cannot get rid of Russian forces from their territories at this time, and it would be a better bet to try diplomatically in the coming years and decades.
For this, Putin will have to convince Europe of his intentions for peace, and hope that they will be able to pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire. But since Trump’s return, Ukraine has proven itself willing and able to resist pressure even from the world’s greatest superpower, even in the face of it starting to side with its enemy.
By now Ukraine knows what it knows. Its Armed Forces and military technology are essential for Europe’s security, and the continent needs a strong Ukraine just as much as Ukraine needs the rest of the continent. What was before a dependency on Europe is now getting closer to an equal marriage.
Whatever Putin decides, the most likely future in the short and medium timeline is more war, more death, and more destruction. But also more endurance, technological advancements, adaptations, and history continuing to play out.
Summary
By year five of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has achieved what many thought impossible: halting Russia's advance. But stopping an invading force and ending a war are very different.
Putin faces a narrowing set of options: a politically toxic new mobilisation, or a ceasefire on terms Kyiv has little reason to accept while its military keeps the upper hand. Neither sits well with him, so the default is continuation of the grinding attrition and the slow decay of Russian power, while he waits for a geopolitical windfall that keeps not arriving.
Meanwhile, Europe has quietly undergone a structural transformation, stepping up where Washington stepped back. The balance of power is slowly but measurably shifting. The most honest forecast for the near term remains more war but fought in a context that looks less and less like the first few years.
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