Big picture similarities between the war in Iran and Ukraine

2026/04/08

Looking at it from afar we can notice a lot of rhymes between how the war in Iran and in Ukraine has been unfolding. Both will likely go down in history as examples of imperial overreach fuelled by hubris and the perceived undefeatability of their military might. 

Both cases are symptoms of imperial decline. Regarding Russia, it is about its diminishing power in the ex-communist space while the US is still in the mindset that they can project power anywhere in the world, and topple any government they choose with ease. Russia couldn’t accept that they are not the Soviet Union anymore, while the US carries on believing that the unipolar world still exists.

But before going into more details we have to slow down for a moment. Iran and Ukraine are two very different cases. The situation in these two countries and their governments could hardly be further from each other.

Ukraine has been working hard to improve itself from a flawed into a flourishing democracy in order to join a defensive alliance, and an economic and political union of like-minded European states. If Russia had never invaded any piece of its land they would have remained peaceful. It’s a free society where the people are in control of shaping their own future.

Iran, on the other hand, is a theocratic dictatorship. The government lacks popular support and massacred more than 30,000 of its own citizens just before the war. It has been supporting terrorist proxies across the Middle East, swore to destroy the state of Israel, and as a side quest has been aiding Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Ukraine is an innocent country attacked by a terrorist state, Iran is a terrorist state that has been continuously threatening its region.

There is a case to be made that the people of Iran and Ukraine, on the other hand, are similar in a lot of ways, however strange that may sound, but that is a topic for another day. The one thing that’s certain is that both have incredible potential and truly deserve a better future.

The key similarities

Both wars started with the objective of overthrowing the government and installing a friendly regime. Putin tried to go after Zelensky and the Ukrainian government on the ground in the early days, while Trump and Netanyahu succeeded with incredible efficiency from the air, swiftly assassinating Khamenei and a large part of the Iranian leadership.

The strategic idea was similar. Cut off the head, and the whole system will crumble. Russia got nowhere near achieving the elimination of Zelensky, but the war in Iran showcased that it probably wouldn’t have even mattered, or perhaps could’ve even resulted in a worse outcome for them. Iran absorbed the hit, quickly regrouped, and even radicalized. The regime got nowhere near collapsing.

Both of the great powers expected a quick and clean “special military operation” without any wider consequences. Something that would give them a power and prestige boost by solving a long-standing national foreign policy problem.

The justifications were very murky in both cases. In Ukraine, it was something about NATO, denazification, Donbas, take your pick. In Iran, it was even less clear. Nuclear weapons, “they were preparing to attack anyway,” or even just Israel was about to attack, so then why not join. Either of these made too much sense in the real world.

They hit their enemies in a moment of perceived weakness when their governments were the most unpopular. Both of these attacks achieved the opposite: the hardening of their opponent in the face of an existential threat.

This happened despite visible early successes. The war against Iran started with a large bang that seemed on course to achieve its objective, while resulting in very little immediate cost for the US and Israel. Russia reached and even crossed the Dnipro river on day one, a natural barrier that Ukraine was supposed to be able to hold as a long-term defensive line. For a brief moment, the road to Odesa - and perhaps even to Moldova - seemed wide open. In the north they were on course to surround Kyiv, a city that US strategic planners already gave up on, and could only hope to at least save Zelensky from the onslaught, which he famously refused. Many predicted the fate of Grozny during the two Chechen wars a few decades earlier for the Ukrainian capital.

Both conflicts resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices, and further economic fallouts were yet to come that destabilized the whole world.

Practical comparisons

If we look at the numbers, in both cases it seems absolutely crazy to ever expect a quick total victory.

Pre-invasion Ukraine was a country with over 45 million people stretched on 603,628 km² (including the already occupied territories), which makes it the largest country in Europe after Russia itself. Nobody succeeded in such an invasion on European soil since World War II.

Sure, Russia is by far the largest country on Earth, but its population standing at around 144 million people is nowhere near that overwhelming. They surely had an edge, but it is hardly close to an Iraq invasion, or even a war against Georgia. 

What Ukraine is to Russia can be comparable to what Iran is to the US.

Iran is a massive state with 1.648 million km² of extremely rugged terrain, possibly the least invadable country in the world. Its population is nothing to sneeze at either, it counts well over 90 million people. This is on a scale that the US has not faced since World War II, where it fought as part of history’s largest coalition against - in every practical sense - a single enemy.

Of course the US is much larger in size, and has a giant population of 340 million people, but similarly, the relative difference is not that overwhelming. 

What gave false confidence to the attackers - besides their military might - must have been their much more decisive economic advantages. Ukraine had a GDP of merely ~$200 Billion compared to Russia’s more than $2 Trillion. A tenfold difference. The US is the largest economy on the planet with upwards of $30 trillion, compared to Iran’s $370 billion. This is an even more staggering more than 80 times difference.

But GDP repeatedly proves itself to be a terrible indicator about a country's real capabilities. If a massive GDP facing a negligible GDP was enough, then the “rice farmers” of Vietnam would not have had any chance against a global superpower, and the Soviet Union would have never broken into Afghanistan. Territory and human capital are much more important factors in a war, and the underdogs have other means of making up for economic differences like weapons production, home advantage, foreign support, and tactics.

Speaking of tactics

The survival strategy of both defenders can be summed up to this: inflict enough cost and pain on the enemy until they go away. 

As to whether this will lead to a similar outcome in the Persian Gulf as in the Black Sea remains to be seen. Ukraine essentially disabled Russia’s Black Sea fleet without having a navy of their own, mostly by naval and aerial drones. 

One might expect that the US was watching the war in Ukraine extremely closely, and learned its lessons, but seeing how they were not at all prepared to counter Iranian drones, it is uncertain whether the US navy is ready to face similar attacks as the ones that crushed the Russian fleet.

The war in Ukraine showcased that any sort of ground offensive is extremely difficult in the age of drones. In this novel warfare, the defender has a huge advantage. Since the US will not be able to force its will on Iran with only a bombing campaign - which Russia has been increasingly relying on due to their incapacity to significantly move the frontline - the US would be forced to attempt a ground invasion if they hope to “win,” which could very easily end in a disaster or at least huge losses.

Another similarity in this war is the clear illegality and the fact that it was decided by one leader without serious consultation with other arms of the government, or the pre-fabrication of concrete popular support. 

As an extra, both agressors and leaders broke previous agreements, which makes reaching any sort of durable peace deal more difficult. If Russia was to sign a piece of paper, why would Ukraine trust them that they would not break it and attack again at an opportune moment? During Trump's first term he tore apart the nuclear deal, then took out Iran's second in command Qasem Soleimani. After returning for his second term he soon bombed the country, and now came back with the aim of finishing the job. 

Both states will desire credible guarantees that they will not be attacked again. Until that happens they have a strong incentive to keep the war going, and not let their enemies regroup and restart hostilities in a way that benefits them. 

An overlooked strategic topic is the meme wars. Even before the full scale invasion Ukraine created a Twitter account to represent the country, where it memed and mocked Russia with the aim of creating sympathy and familiarity abroad. It became part of the country’s brand.

Iran seemed to have learned from this, and is now making similar moves (Si apre in una nuova finestra). One of the latest viral examples was the release of a video (Si apre in una nuova finestra) mocking US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.

Another subtle similarity is about the way the population of the aggressor is coping with the fact that their country released a brutal war with weak justifications. On both sides even if many people don’t necessarily support it, the overwhelming attitude (Si apre in una nuova finestra)is something like, “well we don’t really know what this war is about, let’s hope there is a good reason, but now that we are at war, we must win”